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WHO IS THIS REPORT FOR?
•

Donors, including philanthropic foundations and bilateral and multilateral aid donors, concerned with land governance and land
rights, access to justice and Sustainable Development Goal (“SDG”) 16 (Peace, justice and strong institutions), community legal
empowerment, benefit sharing, corporate accountability, and/or environmental justice, among other fields.

•

Communities who have been or stand to be affected by investment projects, and who hope to find new ways to finance
the legal support they need, as well as the civil society organizations (“CSOs”) that work with those communities or on
policy issues around responsible land investments.

•

Governments hosting land investments (referred to as “host governments”).

•

Companies that conduct land investment, such as agricultural or forestry projects (referred to as “investor companies” or
“companies”), seeking stable and cooperative working relationships with host communities.

•

Development Finance Institutions (“DFIs”), such as the International Finance Corporation or government-owned finance
institutions, potentially as well as commercial banks and financiers, whose clients undertake land investments.

•

Commodity buyers, such as food and beverage companies and other companies in a range of industries, that buy
agricultural or forest commodities.

•

Multi-stakeholder initiatives (“MSIs”) and other bodies with members who include investor companies or commodity buyers.

•

Impact investors interested in improving the social and environmental impacts of land investments.

•

Lawyers who support communities affected by investment.
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“The Malen situation is a classic example of how not to
conduct large-scale land acquisitions …. A company relies
on the government to acquire land for its investment, the
government gives instructions to the Paramount Chief,
who then requires that the sub-chiefs make the land
available. A lease agreement is drawn up by a government
lawyer and … thumb-printed by a few community
members who do not understand its content. … [E]ven
though money is paid and a document drawn up by a
lawyer is signed, it still feels like a forceful taking, a
dispossession clothed in legality. It reads like a collusion
between the government and the investor—an alliance of
the powerful and wealthy—to strip a community of their
most valuable resource. Unsurprisingly, [the investor] has
had to rely heavily on the powers of the government to
deal with the resentment against the deal.”
Sonkita Conteh
How not to conduct Large-scale Agricultural Investments:
Lessons from the Malen/Socfin land dispute in Sierra Leone (2018)
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Rice plantation, Bali.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Communities affected by agricultural, forestry, and other resource investments
urgently need increased funding for legal and technical support. Too many
communities struggle to access the support they need to protect their interests, in
large part because they cannot afford it. This is in stark contrast to companies, who
can generally afford the legal and technical support needed for their investments.
Inadequate support can weaken a community’s ability to: prepare internally;
influence due diligence and planning; consult and interact with a company about a
proposed project; negotiate a contract with a company; monitor company
operations; engage in dispute resolution; litigate and enforce relevant judgments;
and ensure responsible project closure. As a result, communities around the world
risk losing access to critical land and resources, suffering human rights violations, or
missing opportunities to benefit from investments. The inability of communities to
secure necessary support can also result in conflict and challenges that are damaging
for companies, host governments, and other actors.
COLUMBIA CENTER ON SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Although donors, support providers, and others have found
ways to support communities directly and indirectly, their
combined efforts can only extend so far. To fill the financing
gap, promising new opportunities exist. But they require both
catalytic and sustained efforts by a range of different actors,
and present their own challenges, which must be carefully
addressed. This report presents a call to action for different
stakeholders to help communities secure the support they so
crucially need.

FINANCING OPTIONS
In the context of investment, communities often require the
services of CSOs, paralegals, organizers, non-legal experts,
lawyers, or other actors. Yet for each investment-related process
necessitating some form of community support, certain
financing options may be better suited than others.
Nonetheless, an approach that finances community support
both before the project (preparation, consultation, negotiation)
and afterwards (monitoring, dispute resolution, closure)
reinforces and enhances the impact of any support given.
1. Government marshaling
Host governments seeking to foster productive, conflict-free
investments and attract responsible companies can finance
community support by collecting additional money from
companies and other actors, using taxes, fees, and penalties.
In designing those mechanisms, governments will need to
balance the goal of generating revenue with what is politically
feasible. Other options governments can pursue to finance
community legal support include collecting additional revenue
from the legal profession, and using social impact bonds to
marshal funding from impact investors.
2. Basket funds
By collecting money from multiple sources, basket funds can
move beyond traditional philanthropic and aid donors to
secure funding from companies and other actors. Basket funds
offer the promise of securing funding from private sector actors
while minimizing their actual or perceived influence over
communities and support providers. This is done by securing
multiple funding sources to “dilute” the influence of any single
funding source, and having a third party entity administer and
pay out money.

6 |
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Contributing to a basket fund can help companies understand
and incorporate community perspectives into the investment
project’s design, work towards obtaining the community’s
“social license to operate,” and avoid or resolve costly conflict.
Aside from companies, other private sector actors may be
motivated to participate in order to increase compliance with
relevant performance standards or sustainability
commitments. Donors may be interested in contributing to
basket funds that complement and extend the reach of existing
philanthropic efforts to finance community support, and that
present strategies for achieving financial sustainability.
3. Impact investments
Impact investments, which seek to achieve both a positive
impact and a financial return, could theoretically be used to
finance a small subset of community support needs.
Specifically, impact investments may feasibly finance support:
for negotiating benefit agreements that are expected to
generate significant revenue for communities; for litigation
where the community is seeking a substantial damages award;
or using social impact bonds, where the funding for
community support is repaid by a government or other
“outcome payer” if the support achieves a pre-defined goal.
4. Third party funding
Third party funders occasionally finance community support
to litigate damages claims, such as for large-scale
environmental pollution. Litigation funders usually finance the
litigation costs in exchange for a financial interest in the
outcome of the case. While funders may offer financial and
strategic might to inexperienced community claimants, they
also risk interfering with the lawyer-client relationship and
influencing the litigation’s conduct in ways that may not be in
the community’s interests. Third party funding is less feasible
and appropriate in contexts where legal frameworks are not
adequately developed or where rule of law is weak.
5. Direct company funding
While companies may wish to directly finance community
support in relation to specific company projects, such an
approach should be considered with extreme caution. The
community or its support provider may be unduly influenced
by the knowledge that the company is financing the support.
In addition, direct company funding cannot comprehensively
increase community access to support.

INNOVATIVE FINANCING SOLUTIONS FOR COMMUNITY SUPPORT IN THE CONTEXT OF LAND INVESTMENTS

6. Other solutions

RECOMMENDATIONS

Supplementary funding can be raised through crowd funding,
earmarked profits from social enterprises, and community
members themselves, either by paying affordable fees or
providing in-kind services. Further, support providers can
sometimes use contingency or uplift fees, meaning that they
will only be paid if a successful outcome is achieved. In
addition, fee shifting laws in some jurisdictions may entitle
successful community claimants to have their support costs
paid by the losing counter party.

In addition to current grant making efforts—which are and will
remain crucial—donors should: help establish new financing
initiatives, especially basket funds, given their potential to
become self-sustaining; facilitate cooperation between
different stakeholders; and continue to advance strategies for
supporting the next generation of global south-based
community support providers.

OVERARCHING CONSIDERATIONS
Stakeholders seeking to develop a financing initiative must
address a range of considerations. These include:
•

The amount of money needed. An initiative’s likely cost
will be affected by community preferences and needs
regarding support and the initiative’s focus and scope.
Data can be generated and used to understand likely
needs and cost.

•

Efficiency, effectiveness, and sustainability. Strategies
are needed to reduce costs and to ensure an initiative’s
financial sustainability. Effectiveness can be improved
by: matching financing options to specific support
needs; managing political complexity and obstacles;
addressing the political economy implications of making
more funding available; and employing appropriate
governance mechanisms.

•

Links between the initiative, communities, and
support providers. The logistics required to link money,
communities, and support providers may be affected by
whether or not local CSOs can act as a bridge between
financing initiatives and communities; the options
available where no relevant local CSO exists; and
determinations about who should receive money from
the financing initiative and pay each support provider.

Host governments can establish initiatives to finance
community support, including through the marshaling of
additional revenue. Governments should sensitize companies
about the importance of adequate community support, and
establish appropriate legal frameworks to facilitate and
regulate different financing initiatives.
Communities and the CSOs that support them can use the
solutions and considerations in this report to guide concrete
funding requests, demands, advocacy campaigns, and
negotiation strategies. Those interested in promoting such
opportunities should identify strategic moments to advance
arguments and ideas for establishing expansive and robustly
governed financing solutions.
Agribusiness, forestry, and other natural resource companies
should finance basket funds that apply beyond individual
projects, and should commit to contributing resources
regularly, on a long-term basis.
Buyers, DFIs, private financiers, MSIs and other bodies with
company members should consider contributing funding to
basket funds and encourage or require companies within their
spheres of influence to do so as well.
Impact investors and impact investment funds should
continue to explore investing in community support, and
ensure that any investments avoid onerous and unrealistic
repayment obligations for communities.
Fee-charging lawyers working for communities should:
investigate and pursue best practices with respect to
contingency or uplift fees; explore ways to reduce costs,
including by unbundling legal tasks; and consider accepting
in-kind repayments or charging affordable user fees. For
litigated matters, lawyers should ensure that any third party
funding agreements protect the lawyer-client relationship and
preserve community control over the litigation; lawyers should
also consider applying to courts for advance funding of
communities’ costs before cases proceed or for fee shifting
after cases have concluded.

COLUMBIA CENTER ON SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

TABLE 1: OVERVIEW OF FINANCING SOLUTIONS

Financing solution

Funding
source

Investment-related processes that could be
covered

Main benefits and challenges

Government
Companies,
marshaling of funding other taxable
from companies and
entities
other actors, through
taxes, fees, and
penalties levied on
different investmentrelated activities, such
as permit applications

•
•
•
•

BENEFITS

Basket funds,
operated by
independent, trusted
entities and funded by
contributions from a
range of actors

Companies,
commodity
buyers, DFIs,
donors

•
•
•
•

Market-based impact
investments, including
those made as loans to
communities, repayable
with interest or at a
premium

Impact
investors
(including
donors)

• Negotiating (or re-negotiating) a contract with a
company (provided it is likely to include significant
sharing of revenues with the community)
• Litigation (only damages claims where a large
amount of money is sought)

Social impact bonds,
a form of impact
investment where the
money advanced to
pay for community
support is to be repaid
by a government or
other “outcome payer”
if the support achieves
a pre-defined goal

Governments,
donors, and
others willing
to act as
outcome
payers

•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•

Preparing internally before engaging with a company
Influencing due diligence and planning
Consultation and initial interactions with a company
Negotiating (or re-negotiating) a contract with a
company
Monitoring and fact-finding
Dispute resolution
Litigation
Project closure and rehabilitation

CHALLENGES

• Risk of misappropriation
• Potentially hard to marshal enough money to meet
support needs

Preparing internally before engaging with a company BENEFITS
Influencing due diligence and planning
• Accesses new and relevant funding sources
Consultation and initial interactions with a company • Potential to access large amounts of money
Negotiating (or re-negotiating) a contract with a
CHALLENGES
company
• Will not work unless strong and innovative governance
• Monitoring and fact-finding
approaches to mitigate risk of undue influence by
company or financial mismanagement by fund manager
• Dispute resolution
• Project closure and rehabilitation
BENEFITS

• Accesses new funding sources
CHALLENGES

• High transactional costs and data needs
• Only applicable to communities seeking very large
amounts of money from their counter-party or the
underlying project

Preparing internally before engaging with a company BENEFITS
Influencing due diligence and planning
• Outcome payers only pay for successful initiatives
Consultation and initial interactions with a company CHALLENGES
Negotiating (or re-negotiating) a contract with a
• Still requires public or donor funds to finance successful
company
community support
• Monitoring and fact-finding
• Dispute resolution
• Litigation

Direct company
Companies
funding of community
support

•
•
•
•
•

Third party funding,
Third party
usually of support
litigation
costs for litigation, in
funders
exchange for a
financial interest in the
outcome of the
support

• Litigation (provided a sufficiently large amount of
damages is sought)

8 |

• Could help fulfill governments’ human rights
obligations and development commitments
• Governments have power to tax and charge penalties

Project closure and rehabilitation
BENEFITS
Preparing internally before engaging with a company • Companies have proven willing to provide direct funding
Influencing due diligence and planning
CHALLENGES
Consultation and initial interactions with a company • High risk of perceived or actual undue influence
Negotiating (or re-negotiating) a contract with a
company
• Monitoring and fact-finding
• Dispute resolution
• Project closure and rehabilitation

COLUMBIA CENTER ON SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT

BENEFITS

• Funders bring large-scale litigation experience and
significant funding for support, which can help achieve
“equality of arms”
CHALLENGES

• Power imbalances between funder and community
• The need to generate a financial return limits
applicability; some important litigation outcomes
(seeking injunctions, judicial review, etc.) not applicable
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TABLE 2: OTHER SOLUTIONS FOR INCREASING FUNDING OR REDUCING COSTS

Financing solution

Funding
source

Investment-related processes that could be
covered

Main benefits and challenges

Crowd funding,
using online
platforms to secure
donations from
individuals

Citizen donors

• Monitoring and fact-finding
• Litigation
• Potentially others

BENEFITS

Profits from social
enterprise, which
can be used to pay
for community
support

Community or • Preparing internally before engaging with a company BENEFITS
CSO-driven
• Influencing due diligence and planning
• Accesses new funding sources, with few restrictions on
social
how money can be spent
• Consultation and initial interactions with a company
enterprise
CHALLENGES
• Negotiating (or re-negotiating) a contract with a
company
• The amount of revenue generated will depend on how
much time and effort is put into it, and on the degree to
• Monitoring and fact-finding
which any needed expertise can be accessed
• Dispute resolution
• Running a new enterprise brings its own financial risks,
• Litigation
such as insolvency
• Project closure and rehabilitation

Affordable user fees
or in-kind services
paid or provided by
community
members to support
providers

Community
members

CHALLENGES

• Likely to only raise small amounts of money

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Contingency and
Support
uplift fees, which
provider
render fees,
calculated according
to a pre-agreed
formula, only
payable if the
outcome of the
support is successful

Fee shifting, which
entitles successful
community
claimants to have
their support costs
paid by the losing
counter party

• Accesses new funding sources, with few restrictions on
how money can be spent

Preparing internally before engaging with a company BENEFITS
Influencing due diligence and planning
• Encourages community buy-in for the support given
Consultation and initial interactions with a company • Reduces dependence on outside funding sources
Negotiating (or re-negotiating) a contract with a
CHALLENGES
company
• Not likely to generate sufficient funds to meet all of
Monitoring and fact-finding
community’s support needs
Dispute resolution
Litigation
Project closure and rehabilitation

• Negotiating (or re-negotiating) a contract with a
company (provided it is likely to include significant
sharing of revenues with the community)
• Litigation (only damages claims where a large
amount of money is sought)

The
• Litigation
community’s
counter-party
in a court case

BENEFITS

• No payments required up front
• Community only pays when support achieves
successful outcomes
CHALLENGES

• Legally prohibited in some jurisdictions
• Creates conflicting incentives for support provider
• Need to generate a financial return limits applicability;
some important contractual outcomes (contracts not
featuring extensive financial benefits) and litigation
outcomes (seeking injunctions, judicial review, etc.)
not applicable
BENEFITS

• Community does not pay for successful cases
• Making the unsuccessful counter-party pay for costs
can incentivize the avoidance and early resolution of
community grievances
CHALLENGES

• Fee shifting is often limited to “public interest”/
constitutional cases brought against governments

COLUMBIA CENTER ON SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT
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THE DESPERATE NEED FOR INCREASED FUNDING FOR COMMUNITY SUPPORT

Palm fruit worker, Malaysia.
© jaiman taip/shutterstock

THE DESPERATE NEED
FOR INCREASED FINANCING FOR COMMUNITY SUPPORT

Land investments, such as investments in agriculture and forestry projects, continue to
place intense pressure on community lands and resources in the global south.
Companies, often navigating complex legal frameworks, generally can afford the legal
or other technical support they require for their investments. In stark contrast, the
communities potentially affected by such investments frequently struggle to access the
support they need to protect their interests, in large part because they cannot afford it.1
As a result, many communities are at risk. Without legal support in securing their resource
rights or when negotiating a lease with an incoming company, they risk losing access to
critical land and resources that sustain their livelihoods and provide social, cultural, or
spiritual meaning. Without adequate support during consultations, monitoring, or the
pursuit of urgent court orders to stop breaches of law or contract, communities risk
suffering human rights violations. Without support negotiating a benefit agreement, they
risk missed opportunities to secure enforceable development outcomes from the
10 |

COLUMBIA CENTER ON SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT

INNOVATIVE FINANCING SOLUTIONS FOR COMMUNITY SUPPORT IN THE CONTEXT OF LAND INVESTMENTS

investment. The frequent inability of communities to access
needed support is not only devastating for communities: it can
also result in conflict and challenges that are damaging for
companies, host governments, and other actors.
Adequately financed legal and technical support—from the
moment a land investment is proposed until well after it has
concluded—can help communities avoid and mitigate risks. This
support can bolster community efforts to: make due diligence
and planning processes more consultative; influence decisionmaking regarding proposed investments; assert customary
rights; negotiate a balanced agreement with an incoming
company; monitor company operations; resolve grievances or
disagreements with the company and/or government; or hold
them to account through litigation or other processes.
The need for community support in the context of investment is
well recognized. The former UN Special Rapporteur on indigenous
peoples2 and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights,3
for example, have emphasized the importance of community
support for addressing power imbalances and facilitating
informed community decision-making during consultations. A
former World Bank staffer made similar observations in the
context of community-company contract negotiations.4 As these
experts have recognized, communities that lack sufficient legal
and technical support during these early stages of potential land
investments may have fewer strategies available to proactively
defend their human rights and livelihoods, and to assert their
priorities for sustainable development.
When communities cannot access appropriate support, other
actors—including companies, their financiers, and host
governments—can also experience negative impacts. A lack of
support increases the risk of community grievances, stemming
from issues such as mismatched expectations, inadequate
consultation, or onerous or unenforceable community-company
contracts.5 Community grievances and social unrest can open the
door to disputes and conflicts that result in significant human
rights violations,6 poisoned community-company relations,

and/or disrupted business operations. Conflicts and consequent
project delays create significant financial and opportunity costs—
for companies seeking to generate profits, governments wishing
to earn tax revenues, and community members hoping for
associated development opportunities. One study estimated that
delays stemming from tenure disputes can cost an agribusiness
as much as $101 million in foregone revenue.7 Such disputes have
also led to outright project failure, such as a Tanzanian sugar
plantation, which received a $52 million investment but was
abandoned before its first day of production.8
The risks faced by communities and companies, while different
in nature, evidence a striking need for innovative approaches
to financing community support, and to increase the impact
of existing funding. While the largely unmet need for general
legal aid services around the world has been extensively
researched, less attention has been given to the obstacles
communities face in securing legal and technical support in
the context of investment. The investment context creates
specific and pressing support needs for communities, but it
also presents possibilities for companies and other private
sector actors to act as novel funding sources (albeit while
introducing new challenges). This report evaluates a range of
financing solutions for community support that can be
adapted to different scales or focused on specific geographies
or sectors. Given the potential costs of ignoring this financing
gap, this report is as relevant for a company’s business
managers as for its community relations team; similarly, it is
as germane for host governments and DFIs as for affected
communities, and the CSOs supporting them.
Where, then, might the capital needed to finance legal and
technical support be located? What challenges would be
introduced by resorting to new funding sources or approaches,
and how can those challenges be addressed? How can
funding, once secured, be most effectively used to meet the
support needs of communities? This report explores these
questions. A follow-up paper will offer concrete guidance on
one of the options discussed in this report: basket funds.

BOX 1: WHAT IS “LEGAL AND TECHNICAL SUPPORT”?
Legal and technical support to communities includes formal legal assistance, as well as other forms of technical assistance or
advice that communities may need when preparing for potential investment or engaging in processes related to a proposed
investment. Such support may be provided by CSOs, lawyers, paralegals, and experts in business, economics, science, and impact
assessments, among many other fields.

COLUMBIA CENTER ON SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT
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THE CURRENT STATE OF FINANCING
Although the current number of communities globally that
need support relating to land investments is unknown,10
representatives that we interviewed from the private sector,
DFIs, academia, and civil society regularly noted that current
funding for community support runs short of what is needed.
The Roundtable for Sustainable Palm Oil’s 2015 guide on free,
prior and informed consent acknowledges that most
communities lack support and, as a consequence, often do not
understand their rights when approached by a company; the
guide concludes that there is a clear need for improved legal
and technical support to communities, while asking where the
funding for such support would come from.11
One civil society representative we interviewed noted that their
organization had worked with local CSOs to support between
200 and 300 communities in Indonesia, and estimated that the
number of Indonesian communities needing support in the
context of land investments could be several tens of
thousands. While many different organizations already provide
support to communities there, the representative strongly
doubted that traditional donor funding would be made
available to finance legal and technical support for this
number of communities.12 While these observations focus on
Indonesia, they help to illustrate the vast scale of funding that
is potentially needed globally.
Donors often fund non-profit CSOs, including those with legal
or technical expertise that can be deployed to assist
communities. Yet these CSOs almost never have the financial
or human resources to meet the support needs of every
affected community within their sphere of operations. Donors
may also finance external experts in some circumstances; for
example, donors funding community-led litigation may cover
the cost of independent lawyers and expert witnesses in
addition to financing the CSO that is the community’s primary
point of contact. Yet the financial reserves of such donors can
only extend so far.
Communities can also obtain legal and technical support
through other sources, although each also brings its own
challenges. For instance:
•

12 |

Lawyers and experts sometimes provide legal and
technical assistance on a pro bono (free) basis. However,
the demand for such services far outweighs the supply.
Moreover, the need for long-term engagement limits how
many pro bono matters experts can take on. In addition,
many corporate law firms decline pro bono requests
where the counter-party is a company that may be a
current or future source of paid work.13
COLUMBIA CENTER ON SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT

•

University- and donor-funded law clinics deploy lawyersupervised students to support communities. These
clinics, however, can often only sustainably support a
limited number of clients, especially when based overseas.

•

Some companies directly finance legal and technical
support for communities. Yet this introduces the risk of
perceived or actual undue influence of the company over
the community or support provider. Because of this risk,
some support providers also will refuse to take money
offered by companies.

•

Some community members themselves pay for
support. But their financial reserves are often extremely
small, limiting which support providers they can procure
after paying for other life- or livelihood-sustaining
services or activities.

While these sources each crucially help to fill support gaps that
communities face, together they still remain woefully inadequate
to meet the vast needs of communities affected by land
investments. Additional financing models are therefore needed.
As shortfalls in funding for community support have become
more apparent, the need to find additional solutions to finance
legal and technical support has been highlighted by a range of
different actors, including academics,14 researchers,15 civil
society actors,16 indigenous communities,17 international
organizations,18 and multi-stakeholder groups19 and networks20
that include companies, DFIs, and industry bodies. The need
for improved financing solutions is also evidenced by a
number of pioneering efforts to develop new approaches. At
least two organizations have attempted to develop basket
funds to meet community legal and/or technical support
needs.21 Others are experimenting with impact investment,
third party litigation funding, and crowd funding to help
increase the amount of money available for community legal
and technical support.

WHAT TYPES OF SUPPORT DO
COMMUNITIES NEED MORE OF?
Communities who are, or who stand to be, affected by land
investments often require the services of CSOs, paralegals,
organizers, non-legal experts, lawyers, or other actors. These
support providers can help communities meaningfully
participate in, or otherwise protect their interests during,
different investment-related processes.

INNOVATIVE FINANCING SOLUTIONS FOR COMMUNITY SUPPORT IN THE CONTEXT OF LAND INVESTMENTS

Support providers can help communities to carry out any of the following:
•

Preparing internally before engaging with companies. This includes learning about
community members’ rights, mapping and seeking formal recognition of land rights,
visioning and other reflection, and establishing representative structures and decisionmaking processes for the management of lands and resources.22

•

Influencing due diligence and planning processes. This includes advocating to, and
engaging with, government and company actors for community perspectives to be
adequately incorporated into early due diligence and planning processes, including
feasibility studies and impact assessments.

•

Consultation and initial interactions with a company. This includes understanding a
proposed investment project’s likely impacts; accessing and reviewing information,
including legal frameworks and any relevant existing contracts (with the host
government, financial institutions, etc.); communicating community perspectives and
priorities; and avoiding signing a contract before arriving at an informed decision.23

•

Negotiating (or re-negotiating) a contract with a company. This includes preparing
for and participating in contract negotiations, as well as drafting contracts such as
leases or agreements for benefit sharing, outgrower schemes, or partnerships.24

•

Monitoring and fact-finding. This includes monitoring the project’s impacts, as well as
the company’s compliance with any relevant contracts, laws, or policies. Monitoring can
also include gathering evidence for future negotiations, advocacy, or even litigation.

•

Dispute resolution. This includes attempting to resolve grievances or disputes with the
company through informal discussions, formal meetings and negotiations, mediation,
or other processes, such as grievance mechanisms established by the company or a
relevant DFI or MSI. It also may include navigating such processes and employing
strategies to mitigate power imbalances.

•

Litigation. This includes preparing for and pursuing court cases against the company,
host government, or related actors, as well as post-litigation monitoring and
enforcement of judgments.

•

Ensuring responsible project closure and rehabilitation. This includes holding the
company and host government to their obligations, if they have any, to implement
closure plans and/or rehabilitate and return the land to the community when a project
winds down or is terminated.

Certain financing models may be better suited to different
processes. Nonetheless, an approach that covers community
support needs both before a project begins (preparation,
consultation, negotiation) and afterwards (monitoring, dispute
resolution, project closure) reinforces and enhances the

impact of any support given. For instance, legal support for
contract negotiations may be undermined if the community
cannot later access support to hold the company to its
obligations through monitoring and dispute resolution.
COLUMBIA CENTER ON SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT
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FINANCING
SOLUTIONS

While governments, donors, the private sector, and civil society all have a role to play, their
specific interests in promoting financing solutions align and diverge at different points.
Stakeholders’ opportunities to take concrete action will also vary. These factors have
implications for the types of initiatives that any specific constellation of actors may try, as
well as the parameters of those initiatives. For instance, the shared interest of community
advocates and companies in reducing potential conflict in a specific area might result in
an initiative that draws primarily from private sector funding sources to finance support
for negotiations and for resolving grievances, but that does not finance litigation.
Any financing initiative should therefore identify which activities would be covered.
Designing a needs-based initiative might entail identifying the ideal scope to address
documented needs, and then matching that scope to the incentives and challenges
of potential contributors of funding. In some cases, a proactive funding source may
instead be the starting point, and may state for which processes it would be willing
to finance community support.
14 |
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monitor investments, as supported communities could
more effectively observe, and promptly notify the
government of, any issues of importance that arise.28

1. GOVERNMENT MARSHALING
Host governments—especially democratic ones—are an intuitive
source of funding for community legal and technical support,
given their human rights obligations, SDG commitments, and
ability to collect revenue from citizens and corporations. This
section explores how governments can generate funding beyond
existing tax revenue;25 in doing so, governments can seek to
increase the support available to communities without diverting
finite public resources from other important public services.26
Why would governments want to marshal finance?
Host governments, and the many entities and actors they
comprise, may have a number of reasons for seeking new ways
to pay for community support.
•

Low- and middle-income countries usually struggle to
provide basic legal services for all citizens,27 not just
communities affected by investment. Marshaling new
sources of funding can thus increase the government’s
available financial resources to address this vital need
in the context of land investments.

•

Financing support for communities for processes such as
consultations, negotiations, or non-judicial dispute
resolution can help companies and communities
establish and maintain stable relationships. Such
stability can lead to more productive and conflict-free
investments that produce anticipated benefits for host
countries, such as revenues, and help governments to
attract the most responsible companies.

•

Community support for monitoring could also
potentially complement host government efforts to

•

Governments could fund community support for
additional processes, including those aimed at resolving
conflict and/or addressing rights violations, to
productively respond to political pressure they face,
including from social movements or CSOs voicing
community grievances, international partners calling for
the advancement of SDG 16, or even companies wishing
to resolve existing, and avoid future, community conflict.

•

Funding services can help governments demonstrate their
commitment to addressing public outcry concerning
investment or justice gaps, helping to maintain political
stability, avoid popular revolts,29 and/or regain citizen trust
following a period of armed conflict or fragility.30

Taxes, fees, and penalties
The arrival of a company will often increase a local community’s
need for legal and technical support. To address this increased
need, host governments can use taxes, fees, and penalties to
collect additional money from companies to finance community
support. Taxes and fees involve charging a company for certain
activities, such as: applications for, or the granting of, permits or
licenses; the commencement of the project; or one or more preestablished thresholds of production, revenue, or profits
generated by the company. (Taxes on specific processes that
marshal revenue for a specific purpose are sometimes called
“parafiscal taxes.”) Penalties, on the other hand, can apply when
companies contravene certain rules, such as breaches of law or
concession contracts, and would be payable in addition to any
liability for damages or loss that such breaches cause. The rates

EXAMPLE: TAXING COMPANIES TO FINANCE
COMMUNITY CONSULTATION IN CANADA
The Aboriginal Consultation Levy Act,31 a law in Alberta, Canada, sought to impose a levy on resource companies that would be
paid to a fund that could be accessed by First Nations and other aboriginal communities to develop their capacity for, and to
pay relevant costs relating to, consultation processes. Details about how much revenue was to be collected and how grants would
be made were to be included in Regulations, which were never drafted.32 The initiative was repealed, however, in part because
of First Nations’ concerns regarding strict time limits set out in the Act for consultation processes and the lack of recourse for
First Nations if the government-run consultation office determined that no consultation was required in a particular case.33 This
illustrates the importance of adequately incorporating community perspectives into the design of government marshaling
strategies, and of other initiatives, that aim to increase the amount of money available for community support.
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EXAMPLE: IMPOSING PENALTIES PER COMPLAINT LODGED IN AUSTRALIA
The Australian Telecommunications Industry Ombudsman34 establishes a consumer complaints process that is financed
exclusively by penalties charged to the member telecommunications company that is the subject of each complaint. Companies
pay a “volume fee” (based on the overall proportion of complaints made against them in a given year) and an operating cost fee
that goes towards the Ombudsman’s operational costs such as staff salaries. In addition to generating additional financing, this
scheme is believed to also motivate companies to resolve complaints before they reach the Ombudsman.35 The financial feasibility
of adapting a similar penalties-based approach to an initiative to finance community support would depend on the number of
grievances that might be anticipated in a country or region, and the political feasibility of imposing penalty rates that are high
enough to generate sufficient money.

PROPOSAL: FINANCING LEGAL SERVICES
THROUGH COMPANY FEES IN SIERRA LEONE
Sierra Leone’s 2013 Draft Guidelines For Sustainable Agricultural And Bioenergy Investment call for the establishment of a
Community Justice Fund.36 Companies, after registering with the country’s investment promotion agency, would periodically pay a
mandatory fee calculated to cover the average monthly cost of a Sierra Leonian lawyer. Companies would then submit a consultation
plan detailing how they will seek to obtain the free, prior and informed consent of communities potentially affected by the proposed
investment. Companies would then carry out consultations and impact assessments, before negotiating leases with community
land owners and a memorandum of understanding and agreement with the government.37 The fund would be administered by the
District Council, with oversight by the Human Rights Commission of Sierra Leone. Money would be allocated to pay a lawyer chosen
by the community from a network of justice organizations and practitioners supported by the Human Rights Commission. The lawyer
would provide “community justice services, including legal advice, assistance, representation and […] education in the negotiation
process” with the company.38 Proponents of “large and huge scale impact projects” would pay the fee monthly, while smaller projects
would pay the same fee but on a less frequent basis (thus paying proportionately less overall).
The policy, while still in draft form, appears to have benefitted from strong civil society collaboration and guidance; the emphasis
on financing legal support may also be legitimized by Sierra Leone’s constitutional recognition of the right to legal aid.39
Sierra Leone’s National Land Policy also sets out that the government shall take measures to implement a legal assistance fund
for “legal and paralegal assistance to communities, land owners and land users in negotiation with potential large scale land
investors,” as a strategy to implement its goal of creating an enabling environment to attract responsible and rights respecting
investment.40 This legal assistance fund has not yet been established, and it is not clear whether the government will employ the
same ideas that have been outlined for financing the abovementioned Community Justice Fund.

of taxes, fees, and/or penalties should be calibrated to balance
the goal of revenue generation with considerations of what is
politically feasible. By marshaling funds specifically for community
support, a government would create a type of basket fund, which
is a fund with multiple contributing entities; Section “2. Basket
funds,” below, is therefore also relevant to this approach.
16 |
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Trust fund interest and other moneys collected
from legal professional practice
Another strategy for government marshaling of funding for
community support is to collect interest on lawyers’ trust
accounts (“IOLTA”) or other payments related to legal
professional practice. In many countries, client money is often
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EXAMPLE: COLLECTING INTEREST ON TRUST ACCOUNTS
TO FINANCE LAW CLINICS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA
In Namibia and South Africa, interest earned on client moneys that lawyers hold in trust is allocated to a fidelity fund.45 In certain
circumstances in Namibia and South Africa, some of that money can be allocated to education or research in legal professional
practice.46 In South Africa, some fidelity fund money also has been used to finance law clinics,47 providing a glimpse of how fidelity
funds could be used to help finance community legal support.

held in trust by lawyers in anticipation of fees and expenses.41
Some governments collect the interest that these trust
accounts generate and use it to increase funding available for
legal aid. This approach could be used to help finance
investment-related community legal support, although the
money raised would likely be allocated to a broader category
of legal aid funding, given the lack of a direct connection to
land investments. Marshaling IOLTA in a global south context
may not generate enough revenue by itself to finance a large
amount of legal support; this strategy may therefore be better
deployed to complement, and contribute to the financial
sustainability of, other financing initiatives.
IOLTA is a large source of legal aid funding in Australia and
Canada, among other countries. In Botswana, Namibia, South
Africa, and Zimbabwe, IOLTA is collected for “fidelity funds,”
which compensate clients who suffer loss because of their
lawyers’ illicit or dishonest conduct.42 Aside from IOLTA, other
moneys also can be collected from legal professional practice.
Pursuant to a recently introduced initiative in Singapore, for
example, unclaimed client money held in trust by lawyers will
now be allocated to a fund intended to supplement pro bono
services.43 In Malaysia and Barbados, fidelity funds and some
legal aid services are financed by annual contributions from
members of bar associations.44
Social impact bonds
Governments can also marshal funding from impact investors
through using social impact bonds. These involve investors
advancing money for community support in exchange for
payouts from the government (or other outcome payers) if preagreed goals are achieved. Social impact bonds are discussed
further in “3. Impact investment,” below.

2. BASKET FUNDS
In this report, a basket fund refers to a collection of money from
multiple sources to be spent on legal and technical support for
communities. Basket funds can be administered by an existing
third party entity or a newly established trust or foundation with
an arm’s length relationship to companies and communities.
Basket funds can move beyond traditional philanthropic and aid
donors, potentially securing money from companies, commodity
buyers and traders, and DFIs, among other actors. Basket funds
that draw on a large number of funding sources minimize the risk
of dramatic reductions in financial contributions. Such risks can
be further minimized by securing commitments for contributions
to be made on a regular basis.
This report focuses on basket funds that provide grants for
external support providers, rather than employing in-house
support providers.48 Grant-making reduces operating costs by
requiring fewer in-house staff,49 and allows more flexibility for
community members to choose support providers with
appropriate skills and experience. Such an arrangement can
also more easily leverage existing CSOs that have the trust of,
and ongoing relationships with, the community.
A basket fund offers the promise of leveraging money from
companies and other actors in a way that minimizes their
actual or perceived influence over communities and support
providers. Such influence is minimized in two ways. First,
obtaining money from multiple sources with differing interests
and in a balanced proportion can “dilute” any funding source’s
ability to use its contribution as a point of leverage over a
community.50 The risk of undue influence may diminish as each
source’s contribution becomes a smaller portion of the total
money raised, although basket funds receiving money from
multiple entities with similar interests, such as a company and
its financier for an investment project, may not achieve this
dilution effect. Secondly, having a third party entity administer
COLUMBIA CENTER ON SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT
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FIGURE 1: ONE POSSIBLE ITERATION OF A BASKET FUND
Funding can be sourced from various entities. One option is to source regular funding from companies and buyers of their products. Foundations and donors
could provide initial “seed” funding and/or ongoing funding to help diversify the basket fund’s funding sources. DFIs, commercial banks, MSIs, industry bodies
and/or host governments could also assist, including by encouraging or requiring companies within their sphere of influence to contribute funding, or potentially
by contributing funding themselves.

DFIS AND COMMERICAL BANKS

COMPANIES

COMMODITY
BUYERS

BASKET
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AND INDUSTRY BODIES
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and pay out money can help protect against such influence by
excluding funding sources from the determination of who will
receive money, and under which conditions. Design choices,
such as the extent to which contributions and contributors are
kept confidential (discussed below), can further disassociate
money paid out from any specific contributor.
Why would different actors want to contribute
to a basket fund?
Companies might contribute to a basket fund for several reasons.
•

•
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Contributing to a basket fund can help companies
understand and incorporate community perspectives, work
towards obtaining the community’s “social license to
operate,” and avoid or resolve costly conflict.51 Adequate
financing of community support for consultations and
negotiations can improve community-company
communication, help align expectations about future
decision-making and the project’s potential impacts, and
encourage potentially lasting consensus.52 In addition,
financing support for dispute resolution may help resolve
existing community grievances before they lead to litigation.53
Contributing to a basket fund may increase the potential
for stable community-company relations by enabling
communities to become strong counter parties. Basket
COLUMBIA CENTER ON SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT

funds can help communities access the support they
need without worrying that doing so increases the
company’s influence. Basket funds are therefore a
desirable alternative to direct, project-specific company
funding, which may create such concerns.54
•

Basket funds that receive contributions from multiple
companies would also enable companies seeking to
implement responsible investments to do so on a more
level playing field with any competitor companies who
participate.55

Commodity buyers and sellers, such as food and beverage
companies and commodity traders, may be motivated to
contribute to a basket fund to avoid negative impacts and
related community grievances that may harm their reputation.56
Financing community support may also help buyers to fulfill
commitments to sustainability or good governance.57
DFIs and commercial financiers might be motivated to
contribute to, or otherwise participate in the establishment of,
a basket fund,58 as a strategy for increasing compliance with
finance-linked performance standards. Increased funding for
community support (through initiatives like basket funds) could
improve a client company’s compliance with performance
standards or other loan conditions in various ways.59 For
instance, support to an Indigenous community during
consultations may help a company to obtain that community’s
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free, prior and informed consent, as required under the IFC’s
Performance Standards and the Equator Principles.60 A
meaningful consent process might also help the company to
better apprehend and avoid adverse social or environmental
impacts, minimizing the likelihood of community grievances
and conflict. Fewer grievances and less conflict would reduce
the demand on finance-linked grievance mechanisms, protect
the financier’s reputation, and avoid disruptions to company
operations, which could imperil the company’s ability to
generate profits. Adequately supported communities can also
more effectively monitor, and notify relevant financial
institutions, if a company breaches relevant standards.
Multi-stakeholder initiatives with fee-paying company members
may also be interested in participating in the establishment of a
basket fund as a means of furthering their internal sustainability
principles. For instance, MSI standards and requirements that
companies obtain the free, prior and informed consent of
affected communities61 may be more likely to be met where
communities can access appropriate support to help them
understand available information and make informed decisions
when engaging with the company.62 If such initiatives do not have
sufficient resources to make a financial contribution towards a
basket fund themselves, they may still play a useful role by
encouraging or even requiring member companies to make
financial contributions to a relevant basket fund.
Donors,63 including philanthropic foundations and bilateral and
multilateral aid organizations, that are interested in ensuring that
communities have access to relevant support may be interested
in contributing funding, especially to help establish a basket fund
that has a clear strategy for becoming financially sustainable
and not overly dependent on continued donor funding.64 While
not the only model for donor participation, donors could
contribute initial “seed” money while also financing the
development of a basket fund’s objectives, scope, and structure.

Helping to pay for these initial activities could help avoid actual
or perceived undue influence from well-resourced private sector
actors while the ground rules are set, thereby minimizing the risks
of such influence throughout the basket fund’s operation.
Initial considerations and design questions
for basket funds
Basket funds can take many forms, depending on their scale
and the actors involved in their design. Aside from the initial
considerations, discussed in “Governance,” below, that apply
to financing initiatives generally, considerations specific to
basket funds include:
•

Scope. The basket fund’s scope will affect the entities
willing to provide funding; for instance, focusing on
specific commodities or production areas may help to
attract buyers or traders of such commodities,
commodity-specific MSIs, or donors with interests in
supporting communities in relevant production areas.

•

Avoiding undue influence. Steps should be taken to
address potential concerns that basket funds financed
by corporate actors would introduce the risk of conflicts
of interest or undue influence.65 Specific approaches to
reduce these concerns, each with their own costs or
challenges, include: routing the money through a trusted
third party entity; sourcing funding from a wide variety of
sources; and sourcing money from company
foundations, rather than from company project budget
lines to help de-emphasize the link between the money
and a company’s specific investment project.66

•

Transparency. A basket fund may be established with
varying degrees of transparency. It could function as a
“black box” fund, in which funding sources and amounts
are kept confidential to reduce each contributor’s

PROPOSAL: PEACENEXUS COMPANY-COMMUNITY TRUST FUND, MOROCCO
In 2015, PeaceNexus, a foundation focusing on peace-building in conflict-affected contexts, proposed establishing a basket fund
that would source funding mostly from companies, while still seeking to build trust between all stakeholders. The fund’s goals
were to “strengthen and support community-company dialogue and the ability of stakeholders to engage and influence decisionmaking,” especially in fragile extractive sector contexts.74 Peace Nexus sought to pilot this approach at the national level in
Morocco,75 and committed to finance the secretariat that would collect and pay out money for the first year. To date, however,
the fund is yet to become operational. One interviewee opined that the large number of relevant stakeholders for a nationallevel fund created a degree of political complexity that had stymied the fund’s establishment.76
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connection to, and potential influence over, the basket
fund, the recipient community, and/or their support
providers. Alternatively, the basket fund could disclose
who contributes money but not the amounts that each
contributed; this might allow stakeholders to understand
who is participating, while minimizing the ability of any
specific entity to use its contribution as a point of
leverage. Finally, the fund could function as a “glass box”
fund, where all contributions (and, potentially,
contributors) are transparently disclosed; this approach
can help address suspicions of secrecy by allowing
stakeholders to track amounts paid into the basket
fund.67 Determining how much information to disclose
regarding amounts paid out and/or the recipients also
requires careful consideration. Full disclosure could help

to detect any misappropriation of money but could also
stoke resentment among neighboring communities. It
may also be strategically disadvantageous to disclose a
community’s support budget to any counter-party. A
more suitable protection against misappropriation could
be to arrange for regular, independent audits.
•

Role of government. For non-governmental initiatives,
host governments might still play a productive role,
depending on the degree to which they are trusted by
local communities and other stakeholders.68 Host
government actors can potentially, among other things,
participate in multi-stakeholder oversight committees,
offer vital knowledge about the local context, and help
to sensitize incoming companies of the need to
contribute money for community support.

EXAMPLE: KUMACAYA
Kumacaya is a basket fund initiative that collects money from multiple private sector actors for specific monitoring or research
jobs that Kumacaya designs before tendering them to in-country CSOs. Kumacaya is currently based at the Earthworm Foundation
(formerly TFT), an initiative with fee-paying member companies, which include companies that carry out relevant agricultural
and forestry projects and “end user” buyers of agricultural and forestry products. The sources of funding for each job are kept
confidential so that CSOs are not at risk of being influenced or discouraged from applying. In many cases, the identities of
successful CSO bidders are also kept confidential. Each job targets specific production areas where multiple producers operate
and multiple buyers source commodities; this helps to attract funding from multiple, often competing, companies. Examples of
jobs advertised include researching the conditions of oil palm mill and plantation workers in East Kalimantan, Indonesia, and
measuring the quality of free, prior and informed consent processes that have taken place in parts of Liberia.69

EXAMPLE: RSPO DSF TRUST FUND 70
The Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO)—a global MSI with members including oil palm plantation companies, processors
and traders, manufacturers and retailers of palm oil products, financial institutions, and CSOs—established a trust fund to finance
support for participants in its Dispute Settlement Facility (DSF), which uses mediation to facilitate the settlement of disputes. The
trust fund is financed by a portion of annual member fees, which range from €100-2,000.71 The fund was established in 2009 to
meet concerns about how affected community members would finance any capacity building or technical support needed when
participating in a DSF processes. As of December 2018, however, no money had been paid out from the fund to participants in DSF
processes. Two interviewees suggested that this was due at least in part to a lack of awareness of the fund’s existence;72 one of
those interviewees also asserted that a CSO assisting a community had been told that it was not eligible to access the fund.73
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PROPOSAL: A BLIND TRUST IN INDONESIA 77
The Samdhana Institute, an Indonesian non-profit organization that provides small grants to grassroots initiatives and organizations,
ran a trust fund from 2011-2013 to advise project-affected communities in Sumatra, Indonesia. Money from the trust was provided to
CSOs working with specific communities to pay lawyers, resource economists, or other experts supporting communities. The trust
started with philanthropic funding and planned to transition to a “blind trust” with multi-party funding to increase the scale of
communities that could be reached. In 2013, however, donor funding concluded, and the transition to a blind trust could not be realized.
The intention had been for Samdhana to expand the trust by seeking financial and in-kind contributions from all relevant
stakeholders and to manage financial contributions in a blind trust. The “blind trust” element was to be designed to avoid a
direct link between any company’s financial contribution to the trust and any moneys paid for support to a particular community.
Agribusiness and forestry companies that had made human rights commitments and/or had experienced conflicts with
communities would provide funding; donors would finance the trust’s operational costs; local government would be asked to
provide experts and venues for meetings; and communities would be asked to make “in kind” contributions such as providing
additional venues and food for meetings. Applications to the trust would be made by CSOs who had already entered into an
agreement with affected communities that sought advice and support. The blind trust would contract with successful applicant
CSOs, who would then be accountable for procuring the relevant technical support for the community.
A foundation in Indonesia is currently researching how a blind trust with similar purposes and financing strategies as Samdhana’s
planned blind trust could be implemented.

3. IMPACT INVESTING
Impact investments could be used to secure funding to pay for
community support in situations where the support is
expected to achieve a pre-agreed goal that would enable
and/or justify the investors to be paid back. Impact
investments differ from mainstream investments (such as
loans or purchasing shares) in that they are designed to
generate both a measurable positive social and/or
environmental impact and a financial return.78 The intent to
generate a financial return in turn distinguishes impact
investments from philanthropy or grant making.
Because impact investments are profit-seeking, they are only
feasible for financing community support in the rare contexts
where there is an opportunity for significant compensation.
Specifically, impact investment could be used to finance: the
negotiation of benefit agreements that are expected to
generate very large amounts of revenue for communities;
litigation where the community is seeking a very large sum of
damages or compensation; or social impact bonds, where a
government, donor, or other actor is willing to ultimately
finance the legal support, as an “outcome payer.”

How the impact investment is structured will affect who is
responsible for paying impact investors. In the case of social
impact bonds (see Box 2, below), commitments for repayment
are secured from governments, donors, DFIs or other entities
willing to act as outcome payers who compensate investors
upon the achievement of pre-agreed goals. For other impact
investment models, communities themselves could be bound
to pay back the funding; for instance, the RTC Impact Fund
(discussed below) proposes to finance support to communities
wishing to negotiate benefit agreements, on the understanding
that if the community secures sufficient money through the
agreement, it will gradually pay back the money provided,
potentially with interest or at a premium.
Financial returns for impact investors can vary. Some
investments may be structured to only return some or all of
the money invested (“capital preservation”) and others may
produce below-market interest or profits (“concessionary
investments”). Others, still, might seek to produce risk-adjusted
market-rate returns, although such returns may be extremely
unlikely in the case of impact investments to finance
community support.
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FIGURE 2: THE IMPACT INVESTING SPECTRUM
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Adapted from: netimpact.org/careers/impact-investing

Any initiative seeking to finance community support through
impact investing should be designed to avoid exploitative levels of
investor profits that would ultimately be paid by communities. For
instance, if an impact investment is structured as a loan with a high
compounding interest rate, communities could find themselves
locked into a cycle of inescapable debt, as has happened with
some microfinance interventions.79 Similarly, an arrangement for
impact investors to be paid a percentage of any benefit-sharing
revenues might not leave enough funds for the community to
pursue vital livelihood strategies or to adjust for the project’s
negative impacts. Impact investment arrangements should
therefore carefully define and limit when, if ever, the community

would be required to pay. Hybrid or blended approaches to
repayments, such as sharing repayment obligations between a
community and donor, or having a government guarantee a
community’s repayment obligations, may help to avoid
exploitative arrangements and make impact investments viable.
Whether impact investment should be used to finance
community support in a specific case will depend on various
factors. These include:
•

The goal that triggers repayment. Impact investments
usually define the social and/or environmental impacts they
seek to achieve. Yet the outcomes of different processes or

BOX 2: WHAT ARE SOCIAL IMPACT BONDS?
A social impact bond (SIB) is a financial instrument that functions on a “payment by results” basis.80 If an SIB were used to finance
community support, an impact investor would pay money to an intermediary, which would disburse the money to one or more
support providers.81 If the community support achieved pre-agreed goals, the “outcome payer”—this could be the government, a
donor, or another entity—would be obliged to pay an agreed premium to the investor. SIBs’ payment-by-results model makes them
most appropriate where a demonstrable public saving or desirable development impact will be secured by achieving the pre-agreed
goal and when the outcome payer wants to avoid the risk of paying for an initiative that might not achieve desired impacts.82 For
example, an SIB in the United Kingdom saw investors finance rehabilitation services for ex-prisoners from Peterborough jail; these
services were intended to reduce recidivism, thereby minimizing the government’s expenditure on prosecutions and imprisonment.
The pre-agreed goal, a 7.5% reduction in recidivism, was achieved, and the government paid back the investors with interest.83 If
pre-agreed goals are not achieved, as occurred when a similar SIB failed to reduce youth recidivism at New York City’s Rikers Island
prison by 10%, the government pays back nothing or proportionally reduces the repayment of money to the investor.84
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community actions are not always predictable. A tension
may emerge between impact investors focusing on
achieving a financial return (who would aim to set a low bar
for repayment) and the entities responsible for repaying
(who may prefer to give the community sufficient autonomy
to determine its priorities and strategies, so that the support
empowers rather than constrains community members). For
example, a goal focused on achieving a target number of
negotiated contracts could be too simplistic; it might create
perverse incentives or simply not be met, given that some
communities may ultimately decide not to negotiate with a
company. Having different classes of impact investors,
including “first loss” partners who absorb the risk when full
financial returns are not achieved, may help in finding
arrangements that are acceptable both to investors and to
those responsible for repaying. Donors willing to act as a first
loss partner can help catalyze impact investments by
encouraging additional investors.
•

•

Availability of data. For a host government or donor to
issue an impact bond, they would have to view improved
community support as producing a social good worth
paying for. To determine this, the government or donor may
need to generate new data to determine the various public
costs of not making support available to community
members.85 Impact investors also need data to develop a
risk profile for the proposed investment in community legal
support and understand its likely outcomes, both in terms
of social impact and financial return.86 Investors will also
rely on a mechanism to monitor their investments and
determine whether the pre-agreed goal has been achieved.
Financial considerations affecting viability. Impact
investments often require significant amounts of regularly
updated data, increasing their transactional and
operational costs. These costs, and the likely costs of hiring
support providers, will therefore need to be compared to
the amounts of money that supported communities can
expect to gain or the savings or other beneficial outcomes
such financing support may produce. For impact
investments relying on communities for repayment, due
consideration must also be given to the community’s
financial needs for basic survival and livelihood generation
in the short, medium, and long term. In practice, such
impact investments may therefore only be feasible where a
community seeks a sufficiently large amount of money
(through negotiated benefit sharing arrangements or
court-ordered damages awards). Specifically, the expected
amount of money would have to be large enough that the

community could repay impact investors while retaining
enough money to meet its needs and compensate for any
actual or anticipated adverse impacts.87
Why might impact investors be willing to finance
community support?
Impact investors may only be willing to finance community
support if they can adequately assess the likelihood of producing
both a measurable positive social or environmental impact and
a financial return. This will depend on whether sufficient data
exists to assess the risk and expected return of the investment, a
cost-effective financial instrument is available to facilitate the
provision of funding, and arrangements are in place to robustly
monitor and report on the impacts of funding in each case.
Impact investors interested in market-rate returns may not be
interested in, or appropriate for, financing community support.88
Why might donors be willing to participate?
Foundations and other donors are increasingly seeking out
and designing innovative impact investment opportunities to
deploy their capital toward mission. In some cases, this
includes making a financial return that can be re-deployed
toward further investment. Foundations could play one of two
roles in an impact investment to finance community support;
either could be critical in unlocking additional private capital:
•

As an outcome payer. Foundations could use their grantmaking funds to act as an outcome payer for an SIB;
doing so would allow them to avoid paying for
unsuccessful interventions and limit their grant-making
to interventions that achieve the intended impact.89

•

As an investor. Foundations could use their endowment
capital to make a mission-related investment (“MRI”). An
MRI could be used to finance community support
provided the investment: (a) furthers the foundation’s
mission, and (b) meets a “prudent investment” test. This
test may not be met if the foundation is seeding untested
financial products or providing first-loss capital to attract
non-philanthropic investors.90 Alternatively, a foundation
could invest money reserved for grant-making to finance
community support as a program-related investment
(“PRI”) to pursue a concessionary investment or catalyze
co-investment. In the U.S., this is permissible provided the
investment: (a) has the primary purpose of furthering any
of the foundation’s exempt (charitable) purposes, and (b)
does not have the significant purpose of producing
income or the appreciation of property.91
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PROPOSAL: THE RTC IMPACT FUND
The RTC Impact Fund proposes a portfolio of investments in legal and technical support for communities affected by natural resource
projects in the global south to enable communities to negotiate benefit agreements with companies.93 Capital for each investment
would likely come first from foundations and other donors willing to take on greater risk for lesser returns, in the form of programrelated investments. Other impact investors may later be encouraged to join, especially if donor investors are willing to assume first
loss risk.94 Recipient communities would pay the funding back over time by allocating a percentage of the revenue they earn from
the benefit agreements they have signed. The transactional costs associated with each loan are not yet known but are expected to
be considerable, given the time and resources needed to understand the local context and to work with community members before
a loan can be contemplated. If the company only has to share revenues with the community when it starts production or generates
a profit, the community may not receive any revenues for several years, increasing the likely timeline for repayment.
One question the RTC Impact Fund may face is determining what the consequences would be if the community changes course
after receiving funding for legal support. To avoid a community feeling pressured to sacrifice its priorities in order to quickly reach
an agreement and start earning revenue, RTC Impact Fund is considering using non-recourse loans and is seeking to attract
investors more concerned with achieving a positive social impact than with financial returns.95 The RTC Impact Fund model may
also only be applicable to sectors or commodities that are especially profitable, such as large-scale extractive industry projects.
Industries with smaller profit margins, such as agriculture and forestry, may result in much smaller payments to communities,
limiting the amount of money that communities would be able to pay back.

Would communities and their support providers
be willing to participate?

4. THIRD PARTY FUNDING

While communities and CSOs may be willing to consider any
new forms of funding for support, many may be hesitant to
work with for-profit investors. Especially in contexts where a
profit motive is regarded as introducing the same dynamics
that led to the inequality and injustices that many affected
communities already experience,92 communities may be more
open to impact investments that de-emphasize the need for a
market-rate return to investors. The involvement of donors or
host governments as outcome payers might also make
communities more comfortable with participating.

Third party funding is occasionally used to finance community
support—specifically, legal support to litigate claims for monetary
damages or compensation. No instances of third party funding for
community legal support for contract negotiations or other
processes were identified in this research. Third party litigation
funders typically agree to finance the costs of litigation and any
indemnity (such as for costs orders against the client if it loses) in
exchange for a financial interest in the outcome of the case. This
interest could be a share of the money awarded to the claimant,
a multiple of the amount the financier provided, or a combination
of the two,96 depending on what was agreed beforehand. Third
party funding is usually “non-recourse,” meaning that if the case
is unsuccessful, the funder is not repaid for the money it has spent.

Communities may also be more likely to participate if impact
investments are made as non-recourse loans, allowing flexibility
for changes in community strategies. Non-recourse loans would
extinguish the right of impact investors to be repaid if the
anticipated activity (such as negotiation or litigation) is
unsuccessful in producing adequate financial gains for the
community or is abandoned before gains are made. To attract
impact investors, a non-recourse loan could be complemented
by having an external guarantor, such as a DFI or donor, which
would pay the investor in such circumstances.
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Before agreeing to work with third party funders, communities
need to carefully consider the desirability of working with a forprofit partner. On the one hand, funders can offer financial and
strategic might to inexperienced claimants, which can reduce
power imbalances between an affected community and its
well-resourced company counter-party. Indeed, litigating
against companies may require significant amounts of money,
especially where a company’s defense strategy includes tactics
to increase the length of a case, and hence the amount of
expensive legal services needed by a community claimant.97
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On the other hand, third party funding itself can also introduce
power imbalances—between financiers, who are typically wellresourced and experienced, and community claimants, who may
be contemplating litigation for the first time. Funders view cases
that they finance as investments, and thus may wish to oversee
how the litigation is conducted; whether or not this is permitted
under domestic law varies in different jurisdictions.98 Funders also
do not typically have any legal duties to the financed community,99
which is in stark contrast to the fiduciary obligations for profit
maximization that funders owe to their shareholders. This
introduces the risk that some funders may interpose themselves
in the lawyer-client relationship and seek to direct or influence
decisions in ways that are not in the community’s interests. Having
an experienced and trusted legal team can help to minimize
power imbalances with the funder, and guard against an unfair
funding agreement. Host governments also have an important
role to play in establishing legal frameworks that both facilitate
and adequately regulate litigation funding.

anticipated damages be above a minimum amount, or
that the legal costs to be financed be proportionate to the
claim amount or the work required for the case itself.100
•

The jurisdiction’s legal framework. An initial hurdle is
whether third party funding is legally permissible in the
relevant jurisdiction.101 A strong legal regime to regulate
the funder-client relationship should also be a prerequisite for communities contemplating third party
funding. Communities should check whether there are
laws that help to avoid exploitative arrangements. Such
laws include requirements that a judge approve any
agreement for financing legal support before a case
begins, as occurs in Ontario, Canada.102 Appropriate laws
will require judges to make sure that:
•

The claimants’ lawyers are appropriately qualified to
conduct the litigation.

•

The funding agreement does not give the funder an
unacceptable degree of influence over how litigation
is conducted and whether or not to accept a
settlement offer.

•

The share payable to the funder, if the claimant wins
an award for damages, accords with best practice.

•

The terms of any settlement that the parties reach
would produce an equitable result.103

Whether third party funding is a viable or desirable option in a
particular context—for communities and for funders—will
depend upon various considerations. These include:
•

The funder’s criteria. Litigation funders often have criteria
for financing a case, which can include: strong prospects
of winning; the defendant having the resources to meet
any judgment for damages; and the claimant having a
credible strategy for enforcing a successful judgment. To
ensure financial feasibility, funders often require that the
amount of funding requested and/or the amount of

In circumstances where no such laws exist, communities
and CSOs working with them risk entering into an
arrangement that may not prioritize their interests.

EXAMPLE: ECUADORIAN COMMUNITIES LITIGATE AGAINST TEXACO/CHEVRON
In addition to a contingency fee arrangement, litigation brought by Ecuadorian peasants and Indigenous people against
Texaco/Chevron for environmental pollution was financed in part through third party funders, including an individual investor
and a boutique hedge fund. While these third party funders became involved as the litigation’s scope and complexity expanded,
they withdrew their investments shortly afterwards, as Chevron sued one of the community’s lawyers for racketeering.104

EXAMPLE: INDONESIAN SEAWEED FARMERS LITIGATE AGAINST PTTEP AUSTRALIA
Harbour Litigation Funding is currently financing a suit brought in Australia by over 13,000 Indonesian seaweed farmers against
a Thai oil company, PTTEP Australia (Ashmore Cartier) Pty Ltd. The suit claims that a 70-day-long oil spill in the Timor Sea in 2009
caused the farmers a collective loss of earnings of over AUD 200 million. 105
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BOX 3: LEGAL INSURANCE
Legal insurance involves an insurer providing access to legal support, when needed, to insured persons who regularly pay
premiums (these are calculated based on the likelihood that legal support will be needed and on the cost of that support). Microinsurance for legal needs can entitle insured persons access to a limited range of legal support, such as advice hotlines and basic
document review services, in exchange for smaller premium payments.106 While legal insurance has been used for a number of
legal issues, it remains relatively untested in the context of land investments.
Although micro-insurance could theoretically be used to finance a limited range of anticipated or potential legal services in the
context of land investment, it would have to overcome many challenges. Rural community members in the global south generally
do not have much excess income to purchase insurance.107 Community members also may not be motivated to pay for insurance
before companies arrive. And, even if community members did purchase insurance, their claims could be denied by insurers who
exploit grey areas or misunderstandings about exclusions and coverage in policies.108 In other cases, a lack of appropriate
regulation may enable insurers to operate without sufficient capital, increasing the risk that insolvency causes them to default
without honoring valid claims.109 Lawyers financed by legal insurers also may be regarded as serving both the insured and the
insurer;110 this creates the risk that the lawyer’s professional obligations to their insured client may be undermined by a need to
maintain a positive relationship with the insurer, which may be the source of future work.
One example of legal microinsurance is Legalwise, which provides insurance to individuals in South Africa for civil, criminal, and
labor law matters. Legalwise uses hotlines with trained staff to answer basic legal questions and outsources litigation to external
lawyers, who usually provide support at significantly reduced rates. Its most basic plan has a monthly premium of around USD
$7, which affords the insured coverage for legal costs up to around $7,000 per matter.111 This premium attracts clients in the “mid
to lower” income levels,112 but such an amount would likely not be accessible by affected communities living in extreme poverty.

•

Rule of law in the jurisdiction. Given the importance of
legal frameworks, third party funding may only be
advisable for communities where a country’s
government and judicial system are likely to fairly and
efficiently enforce laws regulating third party financing.
Indeed, third party funders may also be reluctant to
finance legal claims in countries without a strong rule of
law, where the prospect of success might be weakened
by unpredictable host state courts or where significant
costs and challenges associated with enforcing any
successful judgment may exist.

company in a particular case, which will decide how much
money it will provide, when, and on what conditions. Direct
payments by a company also raise risks that the support
provider may be influenced by the company, and/or that the
community will not trust the support provider. Such an
approach should therefore be considered with extreme caution.
In the rare case that a community—or a CSO working to
support a community—wishes to accept direct company
funding, steps should be taken to minimize the risk that the
company will obtain a new form of leverage over the
community. Such steps can include:
•

Agreeing on clear written rules concerning amounts
payable, timelines, and acceptable uses of the money.

•

Having an impartial third party receive and disburse
company money according to those rules.

•

Giving communities full autonomy in choosing support
providers.

•

Where appropriate, front-loading payment of the
estimated amount of money needed.

•

In the case of consultation and negotiation processes,

5. DIRECT COMPANY FUNDING
Companies, given their access to capital and interest in
ensuring a stable local context for their operations, may wish
to directly finance community support to facilitate
consultations,113 negotiations114 or even monitoring115 for a
specific project. Such an approach does not comprehensively
increase community access to support providers,116 however,
and makes each community reliant on the good will of a
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EXAMPLE: FUNDING PREPARATION AND NEGOTIATION IN AUSTRALIA
In Australia, Argyle Diamonds Limited (owned by Rio Tinto) paid more than AUD 2 million over several years to a land council
working on behalf of Aboriginal native title holders. The land council spent this money on preparatory processes (such as an
ethnography of traditional owners, hydrological consultants, and social impact assessment consultants) and negotiation activities
(including for drafting memoranda of understanding and contracts).118

EXAMPLE: FINANCING CSO ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING IN THE U.S.
Lundin’s (formerly Rio Tinto’s) Eagle Mine Community Environmental Monitoring Program (CEMP) requires the company to make payments
every six months to a foundation, which disburses money to a CSO that is charged with monitoring the mining project once an oversight
board approves the CSO’s work plan. The CEMP does not, however, provide funding to community members to decide on their monitoring
needs and is thus not an example of the financing of legal or technical support. The agreement establishing the CEMP was between the
company and the CSO, reducing the ability for community members to participate in the design of the arrangement. And while the original
program included an oversight role for community members, a 2016 amendment of the agreement removed that role.119

signing a written agreement that the community’s
acceptance of the money is not evidence of community
consent to the investment project, and that the
community has no obligation to repay the money even if
it eventually withholds its consent or declines to transfer
rights to its land, where relevant.
•

Having trusted intermediaries helping communities to
understand that by accepting the money, and the
support provided through it, they are not required to
take (or avoid taking) any particular actions.

6. OTHER SOLUTIONS FOR FINANCING
SUPPORT OR REDUCING COSTS
Other options exist both for raising smaller amounts of money
and for reducing the cost of support. These will usually need
to be combined with other financing sources and strategies
to meet a community’s support needs.
6.1. Crowd funding

Even with these precautions, the receipt of such money could
exert subtle pressure on community members who may feel
indebted to the company, thereby undermining the
community’s ability to freely decide how it wishes to proceed.
Communities who are organized, empowered, informed,
supported by CSOs, and/or based in countries whose laws,
courts, and government acknowledge and protect community
land rights will thus be most suited to avoiding such pressure.

Communities, or the CSOs working with them, can use crowd
funding to raise money to cover either direct support to
communities or the costs that accompany such support.
Crowd funding typically involves using fundraising websites120
to secure cash donations from large numbers of individuals
for specific campaigns. People who contribute money
typically do not gain any financial interest in the legal matter
or activity that is financed.

Careful attention also needs to be given to which entity will receive
the money (see “3. Linking the financing initiative with communities
and support providers,” below). If the company wishes to pay the
money to a support provider directly, this may limit the amount of
support providers willing to accept such funding, as some (but not
all)117 might refuse to accept company funding.

Successful crowd funding campaigns are able to reach a wide
audience and present a compelling case for making a
donation. They may appeal to people’s emotions or reassure
potential contributors by showing an organization’s record of
good governance, transparency, and effectiveness.121 Some
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crowd funding websites also regularly provide quantitative
data to demonstrate how people’s money is being spent.122
Reaching potential contributors in wealthier countries and
aligning crowd funding campaigns with popular social
movements can also help to increase money raised.123
Different processes or actions could feasibly be the basis for a
crowd funding campaign, provided that there is a
demonstrable and compelling reason that funded support will
lead to a positive outcome for the community. For instance, a
crowd funding campaign to finance a court case that a
community wishes to pursue would need to demonstrate why
having legal or technical support would help the community
to achieve a positive outcome, such as court-ordered
compensation for rights violations, or the preservation or
restoration of their livelihoods or dignity.
Crowd funding is often done on a project- or organizationspecific basis; this scope helps to craft clear narratives and
explain how the money will be used. Where strong narratives
exist around specific issues or developments, crowd funding
for initiatives with a broader scope may be possible. For
instance, the Time’s Up Fund drew on a growing concern about
sexual harassment to crowd fund for a nation-wide Legal
Defense Fund (see Box 4).

Social enterprises can help develop steady long-term revenue
streams,127 as opposed to more volatile financial contributions
from donors or other sources, whose priorities may change
over time. They can thus contribute to an initiative’s long-term
financial sustainability, even if other complementary funding
sources will also be needed.
6.3. Affordable user fees / provision of in-kind services
to support provider
While community members will usually not be able to cover the
full costs of support providers, pooling resources may make
paying for needed support providers more feasible.128
Alternatively, economies of scale may be achieved if multiple
community members pay a paralegal to carry out certain services
on their behalf, such as obtaining documents from far away
courts or administrative offices, thus saving time and reducing
costs associated with travel.129 The Deme So initiative in Mali
follows this model, and community members also perform inkind work for paralegals, such as cleaning, cooking, or feeding
cattle.130 Affordable user fees and in-kind payments can help to
encourage community buy-in and engagement with the services
provided.131 Community contributions could also be added into
a basket fund and might help to “dilute” the perceived influence
of other contributors of funding, such as companies.

6.2. Profits from social enterprises and side businesses
Communities, or support providers, can use money earned
through social enterprises to subsidize the costs of support.
One example is BRAC’s legal aid clinics in Bangladesh: 73% of
the clinics’ total costs are covered by revenue from BRAC’s
social enterprise businesses, which include selling dairy and
animal products and providing agricultural services, such as
refrigerated food storage.125 Other support providers earn
revenues from services more closely linked to their daily work;
for instance, Cambodia’s Community Legal Education Center
rents out its conference room and offers for-fee training
programs on different legal topics.126

6.4. Contingency fees
In some jurisdictions, lawyers are permitted to offer
contingency fees or uplift fees to clients, effectively making the
lawyer the source of funding.132 Contingency arrangements
usually operate on the basis that the client pays no money up
front for the legal services, but if the client successfully secures
a “contingency-generating event,” such as a payment of
damages in a court case, the lawyer is entitled to an agreedupon payment, which could be the lawyer’s fees as usually
calculated or a percentage of the money secured by the client.
If the contingency-generating event is not achieved, the lawyer

EXAMPLE: CROWD FUNDING FOR LITIGATION
The International Senior Lawyers Project raised over USD $7,000 for incidental costs, such as local travel and printing costs,
relating to a UK lawsuit brought on behalf of 200 farmers in Cambodia against Tate & Lyle Sugars.124 The farmers were represented
by pro bono lawyers in the UK, US, and Cambodia.
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is not paid for the work done. Uplift fees operate on a similar
basis, but calculate payment based on a percentage or
multiple of the lawyer’s usual fee for the work performed.
Contingency and uplift fees will not be applicable to instances
where the community is not expected to secure a large amount
of money, such as when it seeks a declaration or injunction
from a Court.
Contingency and uplift fees might be used to finance
community support for contract negotiations with a company
and, potentially, litigation. Such fees will only be useful,
however, when the negotiation or litigation could secure a
sufficiently large payment to the community. Some
jurisdictions prohibit contingency or uplift fees in litigation
because such fees give lawyers a direct financial interest in the
case, which can compromise lawyers’ independence and
change the lawyer-client relationship.133 The use of such fees
for transactional services in commercial settings is common—
both for lawyers134 and for non-legal professionals, whose fee
arrangements are often less strictly regulated. Contingency
and uplift fees—whether for litigation or contract
negotiations—should be considered with caution and only
used where a sufficient degree of trust between the community
and support provider exists, and preferably where a
community can easily seek review of a contingency or uplift
arrangement by a judge or trusted legal expert, if needed.

6.5. Fee recovery and costs protections
Host government lawmakers and courts can develop laws that
shield affected communities and other public interest
claimants from the expensive nature of litigation. While eligible
“public interest” cases are often limited to specific cases
brought against the government,136 greater protection would
be afforded to community claimants if such entitlements
extended to relevant cases against companies.
•

Before a case begins, courts could consider awarding
advance funding of community claimants’ costs by the
respondent government or company where: the
community cannot afford the litigation; the case has
prima facie merits (meaning that initial evidence the
community presents, without being questioned by the
other side, seems to prove the case); and the case is of
public importance.137

•

If a community claimant is successful, fee-shifting rules
could entitle claimants to secure fee awards, payable by
their counter-party, to cover their lawyers’ costs. Even in
cases where lawyers act on a pro bono or low cost basis,
fee awards for public interest litigation in some
jurisdictions are calculated by multiplying the number of
hours a lawyer spends on a case by the market rate for a
private lawyer with comparable experience; a less
complicated model is to have a set hourly rate that
applies to all cases.138

•

If a community claimant is unsuccessful, the law in some
places may allow a court to avoid ordering the community
to pay the other side’s legal costs. This may be possible
where the court considers it to have been in the public
interest to have heard the case. In some cases, courts even
make a fee awards in favor of unsuccessful claimants,
where the case involves testing fundamental constitutional
principles against a government respondent.139
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OVERARCHING
CONSIDERATIONS

Stakeholders seeking to develop a financing initiative must consider a range of issues
that have implications for the initiative’s sustainability and design. We focus here on
three sets of considerations: those relating to the amount of money needed; those
concerning efficiency, effectiveness, and sustainability; and those addressing the
links between the initiative, communities, and support providers.
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THE AMOUNT OF MONEY NEEDED

•

Community preferences and needs
Anticipating the preferences of target communities for specific
types of support providers can help to predict the likely
amount of money required. For instance, some communities
may prefer a local lawyer who understands their context, while
others may prefer support from outsiders who, while
potentially more expensive, may be perceived as less likely to
be influenced by powerful local stakeholders.140 Some
communities may also be less interested in working with
specific types of support providers—such as lawyers—at all.
For instance, in Liberia, many people distrust the country’s
legal system and thus may be less interested in engaging in
formal legal processes, such as litigation.141
In addition to community preferences, financing initiatives could
also respond to unrecognized community needs. For example,
a community that obtains support before decisions about a
proposed investment are made can be empowered to influence
decision-making processes in ways that protect community
rights and livelihoods. Yet communities often will not seek
support until something goes wrong.142 Awareness raising and
trainings can empower communities to seek out support at a
much earlier stage. Costs associated with any awareness raising
and trainings that might be needed should also be factored into
estimates of the amount of money required.
Scope
Another factor affecting a financing initiative’s costs is its
potential scope. For instance, an initiative could cover a
specific area, country, or continental region, or a specific
commodity or industry. Adjustments to scope will affect the
number of communities requiring support, affecting the
amount of money needed.

Data can also help different actors understand the feasibility
of generating a financial return or of otherwise defraying the
costs of financing support:
•

Information about household incomes in target areas,
for example, can help to reveal whether models based
on user fees or legal insurance are feasible.

•

Information about the likely financial outcomes for
supported communities (how likely is it that the
community will earn revenue from a benefit agreement
or secure damages from a court case?) will help
determine whether initiatives reliant on the generation
of a financial return, such as impact investments or thirdparty funding, are feasible.

•

Data about political, economic, and governance risks—
such as the risk of corruption, fraud or theft, project
failure, insolvency, market price fluctuation, or an
inability to enforce a successful judgment—can help
impact investors, third party funders, and lawyers acting
on a contingency or uplift basis to determine whether or
not their financing strategy is feasible.

EFFICIENCY, EFFECTIVENESS,
AND SUSTAINABILITY
Keeping costs of support low
In addition to increasing financing available to communities,
financing initiatives can also try to reduce costs of support.
Strategies to keep the costs of support low include:
•

“Unbundling” or separating the legal and technical
needs of communities into tasks for which higher and
lower cost support (and hence financing) is needed, as
well as tasks that can be done by community members
themselves.144

•

Using low-cost services that charge fees that community
members can afford for basic procedural tasks, such as
obtaining official documents.

•

Using or encouraging pro bono or low cost support145
(or contingency fees), and capping specific amounts of
money available for specific tasks (with discretionary
processes for additional funding, as needed). See, for
example, Box 4, below.

Data to estimate costs and feasibility
Reviewing relevant information concerning support needs and
costs—in light of the initiative’s desired focus, scope, and
objectives—can help to predict the likely overall amount of
money needed for a specific initiative. Yet the generation of
data may be another cost. Useful data might include:
•

Within the parameters of the desired scope, the numbers
of actual or anticipated investment projects and of
affected communities that would likely require financing
assistance, as well as other information to help determine
the likelihood that such support will be needed. Legal
needs surveys, if available, can provide useful insight into
the legal support needs of specific populations.143

The likely costs, availability, capacity, and effectiveness
of types of support that communities might use, and the
likely duration of such support, which may be gleaned
from sources including courts, legal aid organizations,
bar councils, and support providers themselves.
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BOX 4: FINANCING LOW-COST LEGAL SUPPORT – THE TIME’S UP LEGAL DEFENSE FUND
The Time’s Up Legal Defense Fund, established in the wake of growing awareness of workplace sexual harassment in the United
States, collects donations and then pays for (or defrays the costs of) very specific types of U.S.-based legal support relating to
workplace sexual harassment and retaliation. To maximize cost efficiency, the fund requires participating support providers—
who apply for funding—to provide a free initial consultation to their client. It also imposes monetary caps for different services
(for complainants bringing civil claims, investigation is capped at USD $3,000, pre-filing work and negotiation at $10,000, trial
litigation at $100,000, and appeals at $50,000).148 The fund has also obtained a significant amount of pro bono and low-cost
support149 and participating attorneys commit to repaying the fund if they successfully obtain an award for legal costs.

•

Relatedly, crowd and/or expert sourcing—submitting a
call for assistance with specific legal or technical tasks146
through online platforms or existing networks—may help a
community to minimize the tasks for which it needs to pay
for support. However, there would be no guarantee of the
independence or expertise of those who answer such calls
for assistance. Potentially relevant tasks include reviewing
technical documents, researching the company’s
reputation and conduct in previous projects, and
conducting legal research. 147Most tasks would need to be
reviewed by the community’s support provider.
Confidentiality concerns, whether strategic or raised by the
company, might limit when crowd sourcing will be feasible.

In addition to those discussed in “6. Other solutions for
financing support or reducing costs,” above, strategies for
raising additional and ongoing funding for an initiative will
vary depending on the approach taken. Common
considerations include:
•

Frequency of financial contributions. Requiring money
to be paid regularly, such as annually, or securing
commitments to regular payments outside of mandatory
schemes, can help to maintain the lifespan of the
financing initiative. For example, Sierra Leone’s 2013
Draft Guidelines on Sustainable Agricultural and
Bioenergy Investment include the establishment of a
Community Justice Fund, financed by companies, who
would periodically pay a mandatory fee. Obtaining oneoff contributions, on the other hand, will require regular
fundraising efforts. An exception might be if one-off
contributions are large enough to cover all relevant
future support needs; for example, if the support is
intended for a short period of time, such as during the
closure phase of a project.

•

The strength of commitments to provide funding. An
initiative’s financial sustainability can be undermined if
some actors fail to pay. The chances of such failure might
depend on how robust each actor’s commitment to pay
is. For instance, legal requirements to pay fees in
exchange for licenses, and contractual obligations to
provide future funding, will generally be more reliable
than purely voluntary commitments to provide funding.
Another potential source of obligation could be to
require companies to pay into a relevant financing
initiative as a condition of MSI membership or DFI
investment in the company’s investment project.

•

Ensuring that financing commitments can be met. If a
community is granted funding for a specific process (for

Financial sustainability
Any financing initiative needs to be financially sustainable so
that it can continue to provide funding in the short, medium,
and long term.
One strategy to help extend the lifespan of a financing initiative
is to divert a percentage of all money raised into a reserve fund.
Sometimes called “endowment funds,”150 reserve funds are
invested to generate additional returns, thereby increasing the
total amount of money in the fund over time. For instance, a
fund established for communities affected by the Yanacocha
mine in Peru reserves over 25% of its annual income to be
reinvested.151 One drawback of reserve funds is they reduce the
budget for spending, at least in the beginning,152 which might
be challenging if a limited amount of money has been raised.
In addition, reserve funds may fail to grow or even shrink if
investments do not perform well. Financing initiatives that rely
on endowments without regularly generating additional
money may also simply run out of money.153
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instance, contract negotiations) and if the money is paid
incrementally, the estimated total amount of money that
the community will need for the entire process should be
set aside. This can help to avoid running out of money
for the support before a matter concludes, even if the
initiative eventually runs out of money.
Scope (again) and political and contextual challenges
In addition to affecting the amount of money required, scope
can affect the feasibility and appropriateness of different
types of financing initiatives. For instance, a host government
is unlikely to be interested in marshaling revenue to finance
support for communities outside of its jurisdiction, which
could mean that government marshaling is less feasible for
initiatives with a global scope (unless pursued by home
governments, whose outward investing companies may
operate in multiple countries). A relevant impact investment
mechanism, on the other hand, could apply to a range of
countries, provided they have the preconditions required to
establish a workable investment. Initiatives built for the
national (or subnational or local) levels can also be better
adapted to the specific local context, including local laws,
support provider culture, and community conditions. Sectoror commodity-specific initiatives, however, which may benefit
from important entry and leverage points, may be able to
apply across countries.154
Scope can affect an initiative’s political complexity. Nationallevel initiatives, for example, may require the buy-in of a large
number of stakeholders, each of whom might bring different,
potentially conflicting, agendas (see discussion of Peace Nexus’s
Morocco trust fund, page 19). Similarly, initiatives applying to
multiple countries may face added complications in navigating
the regulatory and support provider contexts of multiple
jurisdictions.155 Piloting the initiative with a smaller scope may
help to address initial challenges before it is scaled up.156
Actors seeking to establish a financing initiative should pay
attention to the context in which the initiative would operate,
anticipating and avoiding political obstacles to the initiative’s
effective operation. If an initiative is perceived as a threat by
powerful actors (such as public officials receiving illicit benefits
from a company or bar associations resistant to making services
cheaper if that would reduce revenues for their members), they
may seek to shut down or block the initiative.157 Options to
avoid, or minimize the impacts of, such challenges include:
closely involving powerful actors from the early stages to
encourage their buy-in; piloting the initiative in areas or sectors
outside of such actors’ sphere of influence or interest; and
seeking legal advice to make sure an initiative is established in

accordance with domestic laws, which could help avoid legal
challenges by actors threatened by its existence.
Political economy
Introducing a financing initiative may create political economy
implications that should be carefully addressed. Opportunistic
actors, for example, may regard an initiative as a new source
of money more generally—especially in low-income country
contexts where communities, government, and other local
actors are typically under-resourced. This can encourage
undesirable outcomes, such as corruption, local elite capture,
rent seeking, or an increased number of frivolous legal claims.
A new source of potential funding may also have unintended
effects on existing support providers. For example, it may
elevate support providers who are savvy fundraisers over those
who more effectively serve the interests of communities.158 A
new initiative could also distort a support provider’s priorities,
causing it to alter how it supports specific communities or,
more generally, to “follow the money,” creating new support
gaps for the less remunerative work it leaves behind.
A financing initiative can take various steps to address such
concerns; for instance:
•

Drawing on a network of existing, trusted support
providers (usually local CSOs), particularly those that have
already worked with the communities eligible for financing,
can minimize rent seeking from unscrupulous actors.159

•

Quality control measures may also be helpful, to
increase the likelihood that support providers who are
financed will faithfully serve the community’s needs in
line with the financing initiative’s objectives. These can
include conducting due diligence on support providers
(including requiring references, proof of expertise or
experience, and/or endorsement from professional
bodies) and regular surveys and other low-cost
monitoring strategies to gauge the satisfaction of the
community or a CSO supporting the community with
each support provider financed. A balance will need to
be struck between the degree of scrutiny each potential
support provider receives and the need to minimize the
cost of doing so.160

•

Investing in the development of future support
providers through scholarships, training, and other
relevant interventions can also help increase the number
of appropriately qualified and locally-based support
providers, although this may require significant amounts
of money and time.
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•

Strong governance arrangements (see below), including
an arrangement for a third party to collect and allocate
money, will help avoid misappropriation.

•

Governance
A financing initiative must be administered fairly and must
guard against misappropriation of money. Steps must also
be taken to avoid contributors having, or being perceived to
have, undue influence over recipients, whether communities
or support providers.161 These attributes can be facilitated by
incorporating the following features:
•

•

Mission and guiding principles. Having an overarching
mission—for example, “to finance legal and technical
support to empower communities to protect their
human rights and advance their sustainable
development in the context of investment”—can help
orient an initiative and ground the development of
spending criteria. A mission can be aided by guiding
principles; for example: “funding should not be used to
influence a community or support provider,” “nobody
should interfere with a community’s relationship with its
support provider,” “the provision of funding should avoid
the potential for division or conflict within a community,”
or “no one gets rich from the financing initiative.”162

•

A trusted, impartial administrator. The financing
initiative should be administered by a trusted entity
(potentially aided by an equally trusted advisory
council164). The nature of this entity will depend on the
source of the money, among other factors. For instance,
if companies are the primary funding source, they may
prefer to entrust independent entities with experience
managing and disbursing money. Similarly, while a
government that marshals revenue may be reluctant
(and/or legally unable) to delegate authority to spend
that revenue to a non-governmental entity, it may be
willing to entrust an independent public entity such as a
national human rights institution.

•

Oversight bodies and processes. Additional checks on
how the initiative operates can include appointing
independent watchdogs165 or oversight boards166 and
establishing grievance procedures.

•

Community autonomy. To help mitigate power
imbalances and encourage support providers to be
responsive to community priorities, the choice of
support provider, both before and during the provision
of support, must reside with the community itself, even if
the money that pays for it is managed by a trusted CSO
working with the community. This will help the
community to be empowered, and not controlled, by its
support provider; it can also help minimize the risk of the
support provider-client relationship being undermined
by the fact that a third party is financing the support.167
Giving communities control over who supports them will
also help catalyze community rights, such as the right to
give or withhold free, prior and informed consent.168
Such community choices may be subject to reasonable
restrictions, discussed above.

•

Quality control measures (discussed above).

Criteria for the management, allocation, and use of
money. Pre-designed criteria that guide the operational
and implementation aspects of the initiative can help to
achieve the initiative’s objectives. Criteria can help
manage and predict expenditures and reduce the risk of
misappropriation. Such criteria can also mitigate risks
that money might be used in unintended ways—such as
for frivolous cases or non-priority legal strategies—that
would disproportionately deplete the initiative and
discourage funding sources from contributing initial or
additional funding. Spending criteria can include:
•

Acceptable types of support providers. Can
communities use the money to procure support from
CSOs, legal professionals, and/or non-legal experts?

•

Processes for which support can be financed. Are
any processes or strategies, such as litigation,
not permitted?
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Any monetary limits. For example, the Time’s Up
Fund imposes monetary caps for different litigation
stages, such as evidence gathering, pre-filing work
and negotiation, trial litigation, and appeals (see
Box 4, above).163
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LINKING THE FINANCING INITIATIVE WITH
COMMUNITIES AND SUPPORT PROVIDERS
Actors establishing a financing initiative should reflect carefully
on how to enable communities using available funding to
procure the support they need. Issues to consider include:
•

Can local CSOs act as a bridge between communities,
funding, and support providers? Communities may not
always seek support when needed and, when they do,
might not be aware of an available financing initiative or
of specific support providers that have the skills and
experience needed.169 Awareness raising, training, and
other educational efforts—both about investment
processes more generally and about the financing
initiative in particular—may help to address these
challenges.170 In addition, local CSOs can play an
important bridging role. CSOs can help identify when a
community needs additional support, are more likely to
know of any available financing initiative, and can assist
the community in accessing, funding, and making good
use of the support they need.171

•

What if no relevant local CSO exists? Communities
searching for legal support funding without the help of a
local CSO may need to be connected with relevant
support providers. In some cases, no relevant locallybased CSO may exist. In such a situation, a financing
initiative should be prepared to support the community
in a neutral but empowering manner to locate the
support it needs. This may include, for example, working
with the local community to develop a governance
structure that could take the lead in identifying support
providers through outreach to different organizations. Or
it might include helping to identify a local CSO with
some relevant skills and experience working with
communities (even if not on issues relating to
investments). A third strategy would be to maintain a
network or register of relevant support providers. To
build trust and enable the community to select support
providers without feeling influenced by the financing
initiative, it might be preferable for a trusted third party
to maintain the network. For instance, a network of
support providers could be maintained by a national
human rights institution, as discussed in “Proposal:
Financing legal services through company fees in Sierra
Leone,” above. Alternatively, an initiative may need to
consider helping to establish new local organizations
that can adequately support communities,172 although
this can be an expensive and long-term endeavor.

•

Who makes the payment to each support provider?
Transferring money directly to communities on the
understanding that they would then pay support
providers could present some risks, including
misappropriation or internal community disputes over
how the money will be managed. Yet many CSOs may be
subject to similar risks if they are not accustomed to
managing large amounts of money.173 Further,
communities need to choose which support providers
are financed. Direct transfers to communities thus might
be appropriate—or even preferable—in some
circumstances. For instance, if a company offers direct
funding and the community has a reliable plan to
manage it, transferring money to the community may be
more suitable than having the company pay the
community’s support provider directly. For other
financing approaches, it may be preferable to have clear
rules that place the choice of support provider squarely
within the community’s control (subject to the criteria
discussed in “Governance,” above), while having the
financing initiative itself actually making payments to
each support provider.
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PART I. WHY THIS REPORT?

Rice paddy, Malaysia.
© nelzajamal/shutterstock

CONCLUSION AND
RECOMMENDATIONS

Around the world, communities affected by land and resource investments have an
urgent need for increased funding for the legal and technical support required to
protect their rights and interests. New financing models exist, but require both
catalytic and sustained efforts by a range of different actors. Each model also presents
its own challenges, which must be carefully addressed. This report calls different
stakeholders to action to use the tools available to them to advance opportunities
to fill the financing gap.
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It remains to be seen whether a global initiative or a patchwork
of different smaller-scale initiatives is the optimal way to meet
the support needs of affected communities. In the meantime,
different financing solutions for various scales and contexts
should be tested. At the same time, the potential for a global
initiative—financed by, for instance, significant bilateral and
multilateral aid, philanthropic grants, and private sector
contributions as part of a collaborative effort to advance SDG
16—should be explored.
Any new financing initiative should strive first and foremost to
empower affected communities. Among other things, this
means assessing current and potential power imbalances, and
developing governance approaches that avoid the replication
of imbalances within the initiative and that remedy imbalances
outside of it. And while the incentives of potential funding
sources should be factored into an initiative’s design, the needs
and priorities of the ultimate recipients of the support—
communities—must fundamentally shape the initiative.
Otherwise, any financing initiative that is developed risks
becoming a pot of money that falls far short of its objectives,
is under-used, or—worse still—causes internal fracturing,
division, and fall out within specific communities or CSOs.
In line with the findings of this report, we offer the following
recommendations:
Donors, including foundations and bilateral and multilateral
aid organizations, already deploy grants to provide crucial
funding for community support. This should continue. In
addition, donors should:
•

Leverage their extensive capital, experience, and access
to different stakeholders to catalyze, pilot, and help
establish new financing initiatives.

•

Act as an impartial interlocutor to facilitate cooperation
on the issue, including between actors who may not be
accustomed to collaborating in highly politicized or
contentious contexts.

•

•

Focus, in particular, on the potential for basket funds to
transform short-term donor funding and facilitation
efforts into long-term, self-sustaining financing initiatives
that significantly improve community access to legal and
technical support.
Continue to advance strategies for supporting the
next generation of global-south based community
support providers.

Host governments can play a range of productive roles to
increase available funding for community legal and technical
support. Specifically, governments:
•

Can seek to establish financing initiatives, and marshal
additional revenues to finance them. Any such initiatives
should carefully incorporate the needs and perspectives of
communities and support providers in line with this report.

•

Should sensitize companies about the importance of
adequately and appropriately financed community
support. Where a basket fund or other relevant financing
initiative exists, governments should encourage companies
to contribute funding. Where it does not, governments
could encourage companies to explore the potential for the
establishment of a new, independently structured initiative.

•

Should establish adequate legal frameworks to facilitate
and adequately regulate potential private sector- or
practitioner-focused solutions for financing legal support,
including third party funding, contingency and uplift fees,
fee recovery rules, and, potentially, legal insurance.

Communities and the CSOs that support them can use the
solutions and considerations in this report to develop concrete
funding-related requests, demands, advocacy campaigns, and
negotiation strategies. For those communities or CSOs
interested in promoting such opportunities, they should
identify strategic moments—such as when laws or policies
concerning land and investment are being drafted, or
moments where international or national attention can be
captured—to create pressure, and advance arguments and
ideas, for establishing expansive and robustly-governed
financing solutions.
Private sector actors should use their financial resources and
spheres of influence to contribute to appropriately structured
and governed basket funds and other financing initiatives.
•

Agribusiness, forestry, and other natural resource
companies should finance basket funds that apply
beyond individual projects, and should commit to
contributing funding regularly, on a long-term basis.

•

Buyers of agricultural or forest commodities—such as
companies from the food and beverage industry, among
a range of others—should contribute funding to basket
funds and encourage or require the companies they buy
from to also do so.
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•

•

DFIs and private financiers should share expertise to
help with the establishment and operation of robustly
governed, independent basket funds. They should also
consider contributing funding to relevant basket funds—
to help seed them, to cover their operational costs, or to
be pooled with other money collected. Finally, DFIs and
private financiers should encourage or require client
companies to contribute funding to basket funds.
MSIs and other bodies with company members should
continue to innovate and, when relevant, work to make
their own financing initiatives more accessible to
communities and their support providers. Such bodies
should also consider contributing funding to
independently established basket funds and encouraging
or requiring their member companies to do so.

Impact investors and impact investment funds should
continue to explore the possibility of investing in community
support, and ensure that any investments avoid onerous and
unrealistic repayment obligations for communities.
Fee-charging lawyers should:
•

Ensure any proposed third party funding agreements
protect the lawyer-client relationship and preserve the
community’s ultimate ability to control decisions that
will affect their rights and interests.

•

Investigate the legality and feasibility of charging
contingency or uplift fees for community clients, and
ensure that the terms of such fees are fairly calibrated.

•

Explore ways to reduce costs for community clients,
including by unbundling legal tasks so that some tasks
can be undertaken by community members or by less
costly support providers.

•

Consider accepting in-kind repayments or affordable,
reduced user fees paid by community members themselves.

•

For litigated matters, consider the feasibility of applying
to the court for advance funding of the community’s costs
before the case proceeds and/or for fee shifting afterwards.

Rice fields in Bali, Indonesia.
© Dudarev Mikhail/shutterstock
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“Donors, support providers, and others have found ways to
help communities access legal and technical support in the
context of land investments. Yet their combined efforts, and
the funding behind them, can only extend so far. Promising
new opportunities exist for filling this financing gap. To
succeed, these opportunities require catalytic and
sustained efforts by a range of different actors. This report
presents a call to action to help communities secure the
support they so crucially need.”
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